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A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
FOR REGULATION OF EQUAL
CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
Linda S. Hume*
I. THE PROBLEM
In its 1972 report to the President and Congress, the National
Commission on Consumer Finance called for legislation to insure that
every consumer would have equal access to the credit market and
"that credit should never be denied solely because of characteristics
such as race, creed, color, occupation or sex."' This call reflected both
a recognition of the growing economic importance of the ability to
make credit purchases 2 and a concern that many consumers were de-
nied credit because of their membership in a class, rather than be-
cause of any individual lack of credit worthiness. 3 As part of this
broader investigation of the special problems of availability of credit,
the Commission identified difficulties women in particular faced in
obtaining consumer as well as mortgage credit.4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington; Commissioner, Washing-
ton State Human Rights Commission; B.A., 1967, California State College; J.D. 1970,
University of California. The author's views are not necessarily those of the Washington
State Human Rights Commission.
I. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
151 (1972).
2. See id. at 5-21. Creditor representatives, whose testimony in congressional hear-
ings included the presentation of data on the credit volume in their own industry,
underscored the significant increase in the volume of credit since World War II-from
$5.7 billion to $157.5 billion. See Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and
H.R. 14908 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 306 (1974) (statement of Evan
H. Housworth, Sr., Vice-President, Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings].
3. These problems first received nationwide attention after a hearing held by the
Commission in May 1972. See NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 1,
at 151-60. Congressional committees reporting later on proposed legislation voiced
similar concerns. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973).
4. The problems of women identified by the Commission included the following:
(a) Single women had more trouble obtaining credit than single men.
(b) Married women were required to reapply for credit.
(c) Married women were unable to establish credit in their own names.
(d) The wife's income would not be counted when a married couple applied for
credit.
(e) Divorced, separated and widowed women were unable to establish credit be-
cause prior accounts were in the husband's name.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 1, at 152-53.
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The Commission's report triggered a flurry of activity in the
Congress5 and in a number of states. 6 Investigative hearings held by
advisory committees to the United States Civil Rights Commission 7
and various state committees 8 on the status of women specifically ex-
plored credit problems of women as part of their larger investigations
of the economic problems of women. 9 These investigations consist-
ently produced evidence that creditors were applying different stan-
dards to evaluate similarly situated men and women and that married
women faced additional difficulty in obtaining, keeping, or re-estab-
lishing credit during a transition from one marital status to another.10
Creditors asserted that various state property laws that inhibit
credit grantors were primarily responsible for credit practices that dis-
advantaged women." Consequently, the National Commission on
5. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2. pt. I, at 13-14 (opening
statement of Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan). Numerous bills were introduced in the Ninety-
Third Congress. See Holcomb. Equal Credit Legislation in the 93rd Congress, Analysis
of the Major Bills, in Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the Joint Eco-
nomic Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess.. pt. 3. at 446-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Womnen].
6. The drive for equal credit opportunity for women was spearheaded by women's
groups throughout the country. 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2.
pt. 1. at 13. See, e.g., Gates. Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Sohl-
tions, 27 VAND. L. REV. 409, 418 (1974). citing Campbell. Women and Credit, in
MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN 1 (1973).
7. See, e.g., KANSAS ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE AVAIL-
ABILITY OF CREDIT TO KANSAS WOMEN (1975); UTAH ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CREDIT AVAILABILITY TO WOMEN IN UTAH (1975) [hereinafter cited
as UTAH STUDY].
8. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON STATUS OF WOMEN, TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC
HEARING ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 146 (1973); PENNSYLVANIA COMM'N ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN, CREDIT REPORT (1973); MISSOURI DEP'T OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CREDIT STUDY (1973). See also OREGON
STUDENT PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, No CREDIT FOR WOMEN (1973); Center
for Women Policy Studies. Women and Credit: A Listing of Activities in the Public
and Private Sectors Relating to Women and Credit (undated) (on file in University of
Washington Law Library). For citations of other investigations, see Gates. supra note 6
at 412 n.9; Comment, Credit for Wonen in California, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 873
(1975).
9. 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5. at 151-53.
191-210, 213-17.
10. Similar problems were documented in consumer credit of every type. e.g.,
credit cards. secured or unsecured loans, mortgage loans, and credit accounts. See,
e.g., id.
The author has tentatively concluded that a thorough analysis of the creditor's needs
should include consideration of problems peculiar to the type of credit being extended.
The problem. however, is not explored in this article.
11. Gates, supra note 6, at 413.
The later testimony of credit industry representatives on pending congressional
legislation reflects a similar position regarding the inhibitory effect of state laws.
See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 303, 434-36 (state-
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Consumer Finance urged state legislatures to review and, where ap-
propriate, amend state laws that adversely affected the eligibility of
women for credit. 12 The actual extent of the inhibitory effect of state
laws was disputed, 13 however, and pressure continued for the passage
of state and federal laws aimed specifically at discrimination because
of sex and marital status in credit transactions.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The State of Washington was a leader in this area of regulation. In
early 1973, it passed one of the most comprehensive and detailed state
statutes to assure equal opportunity in credit transactions. 14 The
Washington statute prohibits discrimination in credit transactions on
the basis of race, creed, color, and national origin as well as sex and
marital status by specifying that certain practices are unfair. Thus,
under the statute, it is an unfair practice for a person 15 to deny credit,
restrict the amount and use of credit, impose different terms and con-
ditions for credit, increase charges for credit, or require increased col-
lateral to secure credit if these acts are based on membership in the
groups identified above. 16 These practices are forbidden "in connec-
tion with any credit transaction,"' 7 a term that is broadly defined by
the statute to cover nearly every imaginable credit situation.' 8
The existence of state anti-discrimination legislation such as Wash-
ington's did not significantly lessen pressure for federal equal credit
opportunity legislation for several reasons: a number of states did not
ments of Homer L. Stewart, Jr. on behalf of the American Bankers Association, and
Richard F. Kerr on behalf of the National Retail Merchants Association).
12. See NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 1, at 153.
13. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 6, at 412-18. See also Littlefield, Sex-Biased Dis-
crimination and Credit Granting Practices, 5 CONN. L. REV. 575 (1973); Comment,
Women and Credit, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 863 (1974).
14. Ch. 141, 1973 Wash. Laws, Reg. Sess. 418, amending WASH. REV. CODE ch.
46.90. House Bill No. 404, sponsored by the Washington State Women's Council, was
introduced in the House of Representatives in January 1973. H.R. JOUR., 43d Wash.
Legis., Reg. Sess. 270 (1973). By March, it had been passed by both houses of the
legislature. Id. at 859; S. JOUR., 43d Wash. Legis., Reg. Sess. 696-97 (1973).
15. As defined by the statute, "person" includes: "one or more individuals, partner-
ships, associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives,
trustees and receivers or any group of persons . WASH. REV. COoE § 49.60.040
(1976).
16. Id. § 49.60.176. It is also an unfair practice to attempt to do any of the prac-
tices defined in the section. Id. § 49.60.176(1).
17. id.
18. See id. § 49.60.040.
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enact such legislation, 19 there was active criticism of the state statutes
that did exist,2 0 and Congress appeared to be strongly committed to
enactment of this type of consumer protection legislation.2t Therefore,
in 1974, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act2 2 and
amended the Act in 1976 to broaden its coverage and clarify its
meaning.2 3
The 1974 Act contains only one short prohibitory section: it is now
19. By the time of the 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, 14 states and the
District of Columbia had enacted some form of legislation to regulate credit discrim-
ination on the basis of sex and marital status. See generally 2-4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH).
20. Most of the state statutes were simply "layered" over existing state property
laws and had no real effect on them, or at least on creditors' perception of their re-
quirements. See, e.g., UTAH STUDY. supra note 7. at 25-26. Women repeatedly testified
before the Advisory Committee that credit managers erroneously told them that the
state law required a husband's signature on a joint open-end account because "'the
husband is solely liable ... for a joint account." Id. at 25. In addition, state legislation
did not reach those federal agencies whose discriminatory policies influenced lenders.
See, e.g., 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5, at 195-202
(statement of William L. Taylor, Director. Center for National Policy Review. School
of Law, Catholic University). At that time the FHA Mortgage Credit Analysis Hand-
book contained the following statement: "The mortgagor who is married and has a
family generally evidences more stability than a mortgagor who is single because.
among other things, he has responsibilities holding him to his obligations." Id. at 198.
21. "The question ... is no longer whether discrimination in credit should be
banned, but whether our bill as drafted meets the issue head on, without destroying
the creditor's right to make business judgments based on the individual applicant's
creditworthiness." 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 (statement
of Hon. Leonor K. Sullivan opening the 1974 Hearings). Apparently. disagreement
over the form and content of the legislation caused the delay in congressional action.
See generally id. at 14-16. In September 1973, Ms. Sullivan had also requested that
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress undertake several
studies to aid in development of the federal legislation. See 1974 Credit Discrimination
Hearings, supra note 2. pt. 2, at 509-612. 613-31, 633-724. & pt. 3. at 727-1301. The
preparation of these materials also delayed committee action. See generally Schober.
A Second Look at the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 9 U.C.C.LJ. 5 (1976).
22. Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Pub. L. No. 93-495. Tit. VII, §§ 701-06. 88
Stat. 1521 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91e (Supp. V 1975)). amending Consumer
Credit Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601 et seq. (Supp. V 1975)). Actually neither of the bills under consideration in
the summer of 1974 was passed: H.R. 14856 would have prohibited creditors from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, age, sex or marital
status, and H.R. 14908 would have prohibited discrimination in credit transactions on
the basis of sex or marital status only. H.R. 14856, 14908. 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).
The new title in the Consumer Credit Protection Act was added as part of another bill
regulating depository institutions. The peculiar legislative history of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act accounts for the need to rely on committee reports and committee
hearings on similar legislation.
23. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-239. 90
Stat. 251 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91e). The amendments add race. color.
religion, national origin, age and income derivation from any public assistance pro-
gram to the forbidden basis of discrimination. The amendments become effective in
March 1977. For a discussion of the 1976 amendments, see Schober. supra note 21.
at 20-26.
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unlawful for a creditor to discriminate against an applicant for credit
because of the sex or marital status of the applicant "with respect to
any aspect of a credit transaction. 24 Congress deliberately used brief,
general language of prohibition; detailed implementation of the
statute was delegated to the Federal Reserve Board.25 The Federal
Reserve Board issued regulations to implement the 1974 Equal Credit
Opportunity Act on October 16, 1975,26 and the Washington State
Human Rights Commission recently completed adoption of its own
regulations designed to implement the state statute it administers.27
Both the federal and state regulations necessarily reflect serious ten-
sion in the statutory scheme selected to alleviate problems of equal
availability of credit. The tension is between the general statutory
directive to remove sex and marital status as discriminatory factors in
the creditworthiness determination, 28 and the statutory exemptions
that permit the creditor to inquire about marital status "for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the creditor's rights and remedies applicable to
the particular extension of credit"29 and to consider and apply "[is] tate
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975). The Act also provides that an aggrieved
credit applicant may recover actual damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorney's
fees. Id. § 1691e.
25. Id. § 169 lb. The Federal Reserve Board was assigned the task of promulgating
regulations under the Act apparently because some members of Congress were im-
pressed with its success in administering the Truth in Lending Act. See 1974 Credit
Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 54.
The 1974 Act required the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations not
later than the effective date of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 b (Supp. V 1975). This article
focuses almost exclusively on selected sections of the regulations now in effect and does
not discuss all facets of the current regulations or the regulations that are now under
consideration to implement the 1976 amendments. See 41 Fed. Reg. 29,870 (1976),
as revised, 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123 (1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202).
26. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (1976), as revised, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,576 (1976). See also
proposed revisions and additions to Regulation B in 41 Fed. Reg. 29,870 (1976), as
revised, 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123'(1976) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 202). For a sec-
tion-by-section analysis of the regulations now in effect, see Geary, Equal Credit Op-
portunity-An Analysis of Regulation B, 31 Bus. LAw. 1641 (1976). See also Com-
ment, Equal Credit; Promise or Reality?, 11 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
186 (1976).
27. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 88 162-40-010, -410 (1976). The Washington State
Human Rights Commission administers the Washington State Law Against Discrim-
ination. An aggrieved party may file a complaint with the Commission, which will
investigate the complaint and attempt conciliation. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.230-
.240 (1976). There may be a full administrative hearing after a reasonable cause find-
ing if conciliation is unsuccessful. Id. § 49.60.250. The administrative hearing tribunal
has broad remedial powers. Id. An individual may also bring a civil action directly in
a court of competent jurisdiction to redress an act in violation of id. ch. 49.60. Id.
§ 49.60.030(2).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (Supp. V 1975).
29. Id. § 1691(b).
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property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness." 30
The source of the tension between the prohibition and the exemptions
can be traced to two strong policies: a policy that credit applications
"should be treated individually and without regard to the sex or mar-
ital status of the applicant"3' and an equally strong policy that "the
credit industry who bear the risk of extending credit" may use "valid
and reasonable criteria" to evaluate creditworthiness. 32 These policies
may be in sharp conflict for two reasons: (1) sex and marital status do
have some statistical correlation to creditworthiness, 33 and (2) state
laws that affect the rights and remedies of creditors themselves refer to
sex and marital status.
Similar tension is present in the Washington anti-discrimination
statute. Although the state statute gives guidance beyond the federal
statutory directive not to discriminate,3 4 other provisions indicate that
individual creditworthiness may be considered, 35 and that the creditor
may consider "the application of the community property law to the
individual case" and to take "reasonable action thereon." 36
30. Id. § 1691d(b).
31. S. REP. No. 93-278. 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1973). See also S. REP. No. 94-
589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
32. S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. 18 (1973).
33. There is little published information on the correlation of sex and marital
status to creditworthiness. This lack of information is more pronounced in the case of
sex discrimination, although the information available appears to suggest that single
women are better credit risks than single men. See, e.g., UTAH STUDY. supra note 7. at
6. citing D. DURAND, RISK ELEMENTS IN CONSUMER INSTALMENT FINANCING 74-77
(1941); Comment. Credit Equality Comes to Women: An Analysis of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 13 S. DIEGO L. REV. 960, 965 (1976). See also 1974 Credit Discrim-
ination Hearings, supra note 2, at 440-41; Gates, supra note 6. at 412 n. 11. The sig-
nificance of marital status in predicting creditworthiness is more problematic. Studies
indicate that "there [is] no demonstrable relationship between marital status and
mortgage loan risk." 1973 Hearing on Economic Problems of Wonen, supra note 5.
at 193 (statement of Steven Rohde, staff member, Center for National Policy Review,
Catholic University School of Law). Trade literature also suggests that borrower
characteristics other than marital status are more closely related to risk. See Buell &
Lewis. Credit Scoring and Beyond, BANKING, Feb. 1969, at 42; Boggess, Screen Test
Your Credit Risk, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1967). But see Brandel, New Dangers
A rise in Point Scoring, But You Can't Afford to be Without It, BANKING, March 1976, at 86
(suggesting that both sex and marital status are valid risk indicators in combination
with other factors). Creditors can, however, point to a definite correlation between
certain marital status groups and bad debt losses. The data on marital status groups.
such as "divorced," is not further broken down by sex. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Dis-
crimination Hearings, supra note 2. at 440-41 (exhibit of Richard F. Kerr on behalf
of National Retail Merchants Association).
34. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.176(2) (1976).
36. The statute states in pertinent part: "Further, nothing in this section shall pro-
hibit any party to a credit transaction from considering the application of the com-
munity property law to the individual case or from taking reasonable action thereon."
Id. § 49.60.176(3).
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Neither the regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board
nor the Washington state regulations directly address the problem of
resolving the tension between the two statutory policies. Both sets of
regulations simply restate the policy of non-discrimination37 and only
indirectly recognize the creditor's need to evaluate risk meaningfully.
38
Instead, the regulations focus on specific credit practices already
identified as disadvantageous to women or persons of a particular
marital status.39 Such a "practice-by-practice" approach to problems
involving fair availability of credit does not furnish adequate guide-
lines for credit practices not now identified as disadvantageous and
will not assist creditors, state regulatory agencies, or courts in inte-
grating equal credit opportunity with state laws affecting creditwor-
thiness.
An additional problem with both state and federal equal credit leg-
islation is the failure to distinguish problems of sex discrimination
from problems of marital status discrimination. Although the two are
admittedly difficult to separate, largely because marital status discrim-
ination so often falls on women, the distinction should be made be-
cause it is crucial to balancing effectively the two major statutory poli-
cies.
III. A BASIC APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTION OF THE
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY STATUTE
The primary purpose of regulation should be to minimize the ten-
37. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1976) ("A creditor shall not discriminate against
any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction.") with WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-030 (1976) (race, creed, color, and
national origin included as bases of discrimination). This reflects the broader cover-
age of the Washington statute. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.176 (1976).
38. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1976) ("Except as otherwise provided in
this section, a creditor may request and consider any information concerning the
probable continuity of an applicant's ability to repay if such information is requested
and considered without regard to sex or marital status.") with WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
162-40-210 (1976). The creditor is thus free to use any information to evaluate
creditworthiness in a manner of his or her own choosing, provided that the acquisition
or use of such information is not barred by a specific regulation. If, however, such an
acquisition or use, though not now specifically barred, does in fact discriminate on the
basis of sex or marital status, it would be unlawful under the general proviso.
39. The federal statute contains no definition of marital status. The regulations de-
fine marital status as "the state of being unmarried, married or separated, as defined by
applicable State law" and further provide that "unmarried" includes divorced or
widowed. 12 C.F.R. § 202.3(n) (1976). For the comparable state provision, see
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 162-40-040(14) (1976).
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sion between the two policies of the legislation. That is, credit applica-
tions should be evaluated without undue or unjustified emphasis on
the group membership of an applicant for credit while still permitting
the creditor to give maximum attention to factors that demonstrably
affect credit risk. Satisfying this dual purpose requires a two-step regu-
latory analysis. First, a precise identification of the group affected by
a specific credit practice must be made. This identification should be
coupled with an analysis of the components of creditworthiness. Once
this analysis is made, the regulatory agency is then in a position to
ascertain the actual characteristics of the affected group, assess the
impact of the practice on the group, and measure the reliability of the
practice as an indicator of risk.
The most difficult portion of this analysis is the second step: to pin-
point the elements of creditworthiness which neither the federal regu-
lations nor the Washington regulations define. Creditworthiness is
generally agreed to be a function of the ability and willingness to pay
debts.40 Although not frequently articulated, creditworthiness is also a
function of the creditor's rights and remedies with respect to property
available for the payment of debts, a matter usually governed by state
law. 4
1
Judging the ability and willingness to pay is a subjective process,
and it is heavily based on the personal characteristics of the applicant
for credit. Historically, the personal characteristics of sex and marital
status have been used to make this judgment. At one level, evaluation
of these factors is simply the businessman's good judgment, "based on
experience gained through previous credit decisions, either his own or
those of business associates." 42 Recently, more "objective" credit
scoring systems have been developed that give an assigned weight to
those personal characteristics of a credit applicant that have a de-
40. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (statement
of Thomas A. Haeussler for the National Consumer Finance Ass'n). See Littlefield,
supra note 13, at 579, citing R. ETTINGER & D. GOLIEB, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS 59
(5th ed. 1972).
Some business literature also divides creditworthiness into more than two elements.
Some representatives of the credit industry also identify stability as a factor in the
creditworthiness determination. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra
note 2, at 412 (statement of Richard F. Kerr for the National Retail Merchants Asso-
ciation). Stability appears to be an element of the willingness to pay rather than an
independent factor and will be so treated here.
41. Cf. PREFATORY NOTE, UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1969 version).
42. Myers & Forgy. The Development of Numerical Credit Evaluation Systems, 58
AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N J. 799 (1963).
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monstrable relationship to risk.43 Regardless of the credit evaluation
system a particular creditor employs or the subjective factors present
in that system, it is possible to ascertain either the reason why a per-
sonal characteristic such as sex or marital status is thought to measure
the ability or willingness to pay, or the statistical correlation between
groups possessing that personal characteristic and risk. Once the un-
derlying rationale for a credit practice is pinpointed, it can be scruti-
nized to determine how effective the practice is as an indicator of risk.
Interestingly, the underlying rationale for many of the credit prac-
tices that are now the subject of regulation is some generalization that
credit granters make about a sex or marital status group to which the
credit applicant belongs. Creditors then assume that each member of
the group will act in accordance with the generalization and use that
assumption as a criterion to grant credit. Thus, for example, a credit
grantor may deny credit to a pregnant woman because it assumes that
she will leave the work force after the birth of the child, or may re-
voke the credit of a divorced person because it assumes that persons in
that category are unstable. The obvious vice in credit practices based
on such assumptions is that they may not be uniformly accurate as to
the conduct of the individual members of the group which they pur-
port to characterize. 44 Another problem, which is not a weakness in
the same sense, is that the assumption may simply not be one on
which society wishes to permit its institutions to act. Regulatory con-
duct might be based on either of these conclusions about the operative
effect of a group generalization.
In order to assess accurately the operative effect, or impact, of the
generalization on the group, the regulatory agency must first deter-
mine exactly which group is the subject of a generalization and then
obtain accurate information about the characteristics of the group vis-
L-vis the use of credit. In other words, for effective regulation it is nec-
essary to know how many group members actually behave in accord-
ance with a particular generalization. If the generalization is in fact
43. See generally Boggess, supra note 33.
44. For example, the fact that some, or even many women leave the labor market
when they have children, does not control whether a particular woman will do so.
Comparative data from the United States Department of Labor illustrates the de-
clining statistical validity of this assumption; "In 1940 the labor force participation
rate of mothers was only a small fraction of that for all women (9 percent versus 28
percent) but in 1974 the rate for mothers was slightly higher than that for all women-
46 and 45 percent, respectively." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS 26 (1975).
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100% accurate, that is, every group member behaves in accordance
with it, then, presumably, the generalization is a highly reliable indic-
ator of risk and the creditor grantor should be permitted to act on it.
The only exception to this conclusion would be where the generaliza-
tion, although accurate, is one on which society does not wish credit
institutions to act. At the other extreme, if the generalization is 100%
inaccurate, it does not reliably predict the conduct of group members,
does not indicate risk, and should not be used as a credit granting cri-
terion.
Obviously, generalizations are rarely either 100 % accurate or inac-
curate. More commonly, they properly characterize the conduct of at
least some members of the group. Faced with partial statistical accu-
racy, a regulatory body, if it respects both statutory policies, must
seek a method to preserve the risk evaluative features of a credit prac-
tice while enabling group members not properly characterized by the
generalization to obtain credit. Often this can be accomplished by
requiring the creditor to focus on personal characteristics other than
the broad categories of sex or marital status that will produce the
same or a similar measure of risk.
Creditors engage in still other practices, such as regularly obtaining
the signature of both spouses on credit instruments, because they be-
lieve these practices are vital to the maximum preservation of their
rights and remedies under state laws. Such creditor requirements fall
into two major categories vis-A-vis the actual operation of state laws:
those that are based on an erroneous view of the ability of members of
particular groups to bind resources for the repayment of debts, and
those that actually have a relationship to the assets available for the
repayment of debts. When a practice is based on an erroneous view of
the operation of state laws, use of the practice is similar to use of a
group generalization that is 100% inaccurate-the practice has no
relationship to risk and unfairly prevents group members from ob-
taining credit. Consequently, it is an appropriate subject for prohibi-
tory regulation. But when the practice accurately reflects the needs of
the creditor pursuant to state laws governing assets available for debt
repayment, the regulatory agency must seek methods to preserve the
creditor's rights while maximizing the ability of members of the
groups protected by equal credit legislation to obtain credit. This is a
difficult and tedious task because it involves careful study of the oper-
ation of fifty state property law systems and subtle judgments about
344
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the extent to which members of protected groups may be disadvan-
taged by the operation of such laws.
A few credit practices now prohibited by regulation did not involve
risk evaluation at all and were used simply for the convenience of the
creditor. 45 In such instances the disadvantage to the protected group is
the primary consideration of the regulatory agency because the policy
of non-discrimination is of greater importance than non-risk related
convenience.
IV. EVALUATING EXISTING EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY REGULATIONS IN TERMS OF A
BASIC APPROACH
An examination of selected regulations in the context of the sug-
gested basic approach illustrates the way in which a more detailed
analysis of the components of the two statutory policies could lead to
effective -resolution of the tensions present in the statue. This examina-
tion demonstrates the critical importance of defining the group af-
fected by a credit practice and explores the need for sound evalua-
tion of the underlying rationale for credit practices that affect groups
protected by equal credit opportunity legislation. In addition, this
analysis graphically reveals the critical need for state-by-state exam-
ination of laws which may affect creditors' rights and remedies there-
by relating to creditworthiness.
A. Identifying the Group Affected by a Credit Practice and
Examining the Value of the Practice as a Risk Indicator
1. Inability to maintain a separate account
Prior to regulation, several prevalent credit practices prevented a
female spouse from establishing a credit identity apart from her hus-
band. These practices, as identified in the testimony of women
throughout the country, included cancelling the accounts of women
who married and requiring them to reapply in their new husbands'
names, 46 refusing to open separate accounts for married women,47
45. See, e.g., note 50 and accompanying text infra.
46. See NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 1, at 153; S. REP. No.
93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973); UTAH STUDY, supra note 7, at 15.
47. See UTAH STUDY, supra note 7, at 15; S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1973).
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and using more stringent requirements to evaluate married women. 48
As a practical matter such practices, though burdensome, are not seri-
ously disadvantageous to women while the marriage continues be-
cause wives are generally free to obtain and use an account in their
husbands' names. Women who later divorced, separated, or became
widowed, however, frequently could not establish credit in their own
name because they lacked a credit history to demonstrate willingness
to pay.
4 9
The credit industry justified these practices primarily on the
grounds that it was too expensive for a creditor to open accounts in
the wife's name, or that it was more convenient to deal only with the
husband. 50 Some creditors also believed that the wife lacked authority
to make credit purchases without the husband's signature. 51 Some of
the more candid industry spokesmen admitted, however, that creditors
did not wish to do business with wives because they regarded the hus-
band as the real source of support for the family.52 This attitude was
based on the assumption that married women worked for "pin mo-
ney" or would have children and leave the labor force to care for
them.
The current regulations, by prohibiting the practices mentioned
above, take the position that such practices are seriously disadvanta-
geous to women and, by implication, not sufficiently risk-related to be
necessary for creditor protection. Accordingly, a creditor cannot re-
fuse to grant a separate account to a creditworthy applicant, 53 take
into account the existence of a telephone listing in the applicant's
name,5 4 or use sex as a factor in a credit scoring system "or other
48. Creditors frequently required a married woman to obtain her husband's sig-
nature on a joint account, but did not require the wife's signature. The credit history of
the husband was routinely evaluated when a married woman applied for credit, but
the wife's credit history was seldom checked. See UTAH STUDY, supra note 7. at 21-26.
49. See UTAH STUDY. supra note 7, at 75-85; S. REP. No. 93-278. 93d Cong.. 1st
Sess. 17 (1973).
50. See UTAH STUDY, supra note 7, at 29. See also Gates. supra note 6, at 415
(statement of spokesperson for Sears, Roebuck and Company).
51. See, e.g., UTAH STUDY, supra note 7, at 25-26.
52. See 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 311 (statement of
Eugene H. Adams before the Florida Bankers Association). Mr. Adams recognized
the danger of group assumptions and pointed out that presumptions that women of
childbearing age will leave the labor force are often false. Id. at 310-11. See also
UTAH STUDY. supra note 7, at 23-25; Comment, Credit Equality Comes to Women:
An Analysis of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 S. DIEGO L. REV. 960. 965
(1976).
53. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(b) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CoDE § 162-40-060 (1976).
54. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(g) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-200 (1976).
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method of evaluating applications. '55 The ability to open a separate
account in her own name means that a married woman with indepen-
dent income can maintain an account that will be reported regularly
to the credit bureau thereby generating an all-important credit history.
Several companion provisions insure that the participation of the
female spouse in a joint account will be noted on the account and
reported to the credit bureaus, 56 and require that a creditor include in
any evaluation of creditworthiness the credit history of accounts
which both spouses use or for which both spouses are contractually
liable.57
The more detailed analysis of these regulations according to the
suggested basic approach fully supports this regulatory position. The
identified practices disadvantage the female spouse exclusively and
therefore have their principal impact on a sex group, not a marital
status group. The underlying rationale for these practices was either a
generalization about women as a group that did not apply to signifi-
cant numbers of women, an erroneous view of the law, the conveni-
ence of the creditor, or a combination of the three.
None of these justifications can withstand even cursory scrutiny,
and, therefore, the credit practices based on them have minimal value
as risk indicators. Commentator after commentator, backed by hard
government statistics, has pointed to the expanded role of women,
Creditors consider the existence of a telephone in the applicant's name a strong indi-
cator of willingness to pay. Boggess, supra note 33, at 116. This -practice often oper-
ates to the disadvantage of married women whose telephone listings are usually in
the husband's name. Under the regulations cited above, the creditor may consider the
existence of a telephone in the applicant's home.
55. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (1976). See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-190
(1976).
56. For accounts established on or after November 1, 1976, the creditor must
determine whether an account is one which both spouses will use or on which both will
be contractually liable. If so, the creditor must "designate any such account to reflect
the fact of participation of both spouses"' and report information concerning the ac-
count "to consumer reporting agencies in a manner which will enable such agencies
to provide access to information about the account in the name of each spouse."
12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) (1976). A parallel provision requires creditors either to treat
joint accounts already in existence on November 1 in the same manner as accounts
opened on or after November 1, or to deliver a notice to such account holders that
they may have credit information on the account reported in both spouse's names if
they so request. Id. § 202.6(b).
Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-260 (1976) with 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a)
(1976). The state regulation requires that the creditor designate joint accounts to re-
flect the participation of both spouses. In addition, such designation must provide
access to the account in the name of each participating spouse.
57. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5() (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-230 (1976).
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particularly married women, in the labor force.5 8 This data reveals
that large numbers of married women enter and remain in the labor
force. Many of these women contribute substantially to family in-
come, or actually support the family rather than merely earn "pin
money." Thus, the creditor's assumptions are simply incorrect in
many cases. Similarly, creditor's perceptions that state laws required
them to deal with the husband frequently proved to be the result of
incorrect or incomplete information,5 9 and finally, the "cost" to open
separate accounts for married women was not substantiated. 60 There-
fore, only the convenience of the creditor remains to be considered
against the large numbers of married women denied credit and a
credit history by the universal insistence on dealing only with the hus-
band or in the husband's name. Because convenience is not a risk fac-
tor, the policy of non-discrimination is the principal policy to be fur-
thered by regulation.
2. "Change of name or marital status"
When analyzed in terms of the basic approach, the above regula-
tions further the credit needs of women without causing creditors any
undue hardship. In contrast, the so-called "change of name or marital
status" regulation 6' fails to survive the more detailed analysis. Al-
though this regulation has the same general purpose as the prior ex-
58. The most recent data available from the United States Department of Labor
thoroughly analyzes the role of women in the national labor force based on 1974 data.
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS (1975).
One of the most prevalent trends is an increase in the number of married women in
the labor force. Married women comprise 58% of a work force of 33 million women
who constitute over 39% of the entire work force. In addition, the national labor
force increased by 1.5 million workers in 1975, with adult women accounting for 1.1
million of this increase. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INT'L WOMEN'S
YEAR, ". . . To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION . . ." JUSTICE FOR AMERICAN WOMEN
57 (1976). See also 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5.
pt. 1, at 4-35; 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 311.
59. See UTAH STUDY, supra note 7 at 23-25; 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings,
supra note 2, at 360-94.
60. No real data on the cost to a creditor to open and maintain separate accounts
for each spouse was presented in connection with the equal credit opportunity legisla-
tion. Common sense, however, indicates that it would be more expensive if each
spouse has his or her own account with each creditor, although creditors themselves
appear to disagree on this matter. See UTAH STUDY. supra note 7. at 29. Creditors
would incur such costs primarily in connection with open end accounts and small
loans. Of course, "cost" does not explain the refusal of creditors to use the wife's
name on an account.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(i)(1) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-220(1)
(1976).
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amples-to protect the female spouse from the loss of her credit iden-
tity-it fails to separate the sex group impact from the effect of the
credit practice on various marital status groups. Consequently, the
credit characteristics of these affected marital status groups have not
been examined independently or carefully and the statutory policy of
protecting the creditors' needs may not have been properly imple-
mented.
Under the change of name or marital status regulation, a creditor
may not require a reapplication, nor may it terminate or alter the
terms of an existing open end account when it learns of a change of
name or marital status unless it has evidence of inability or unwilling-
ness to pay.62 As previously pointed out, the practice of closing or
requiring a reapplication for the accounts of women who get married,
or become divorced, widowed, or separated is primarily sex discrimi-
nation because the creditor only takes action when it learns of a
change of the woman's name. Of course, a marital status change
usually accompanies the name change, but the creditor learns of the
former only as an incident to the latter. Most importantly, the creditor
rarely learns of similar changes in the marital status of males simply
because men do not change their names when changing marital status.
This regulation could have eliminated the burden on women by
forbidding the creditor from taking action on an account when it
learns of a change of name. It goes beyond this, however, and pre-
cludes the specified actions when the creditor learns of a change in
marital status. It is unclear whether this regulation represents the
judgment that creditors only take such actions against women who
change their marital status. If so, it is consistent with the change of
name portion of the regulation and is aimed primarily at sex discrimi-
nation. Such a regulatory position would appear to be sound because
there is no justification for terminating or re-evaluating women's ac-
counts only.
The confusion results from language in the regulation that is broad
enough to preclude the creditor from re-evaluating the accounts of
anyone, male or female, who changes marital status. This language
fails to separate the groups affected by a name change from those af-
fected by marital status changes, and therefore it never focuses on
how creditors' rights are altered by a change in marital status. Even
62. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(i)(1) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-220(l)
(1976).
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the limited information available suggests that risk may be signifi-
cantly related to marital status and that this correlation, as well as rel-
evant statutes, should be explored further. 63
In order to implement properly both statutory policies in the con-
text of marital status discrimination, the regulatory agency should first
identify and separate particular marital status changes such as single
to married, married to separated, etc. The operation of laws control-
ling changes in asset or debt status, and data concerning the nature
and extent of changes in risk that accompany particular marital status
changes should then be examined. This analysis would enable the reg-
ulatory agency to determine how significant the correlation between a
particular marital status change and an increase in creditor risk ac-
tually is. If there is a significant correlation, the inquiry should be ex-
tended to data that will assess the impact of the practice on the group.
As previously suggested, if the impact is severe, the regulation can
seek alternative methods to focus on risk evaluation as well as to mini-
mize the impact on the marital status group.
Despite the failure of this regulation to separate clearly the sex dis-
criminatory aspects of the credit practice from those based on marital
status or to examine the components of creditworthiness, needs of
creditors are in fact recognized and protected. A creditor may take
action if it has evidence of inability or unwillingness to pay or if the
account were granted solely on the basis of income earned by the
spouse of the account holder.6 4 These exceptions indirectly acknowl-
edge some of the potential economic consequences of a change in
marital status. They also may represent a judgment that, given the
prejudicial assumptions that sometimes accompany changes in marital
status, e.g., that all divorced persons are unstable, 65 it is better to pre-
63. For example. if the transition is from married to either divorced or separated.
assets previously available for the payment of debts may no longer be accessible to
the creditor, or an account holder may have greater debt obligations by virtue of the
divorce or separation. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.040(2) (1975). For a compila-
tion of the statutes of all 50 states that deal with divorce, support. dower, and curtesy.
see Beckey, Women and Credit: A 50-State Study of Laws in the Area of Married
Women's Property Rights, Support Laws, Divorce, Exemption, Homestead, Dower
and Curtesy for Purposes of Identifying Possible Statutory Origins of Discrimination
in the Granting of Credit When Such Treatment Is Based Primarily on Sex or Marital
Status, in 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 727-1301. Similarily.
if the transition is from single to married, the assets of the single person will become
liable for debts incurred by the spouse under the family expense statutes existing in
22 states. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.040 (1975).
64. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(i)(2) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-220(2)
(1976).
65. See, e.g., 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 412.
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clude the specified creditor actions on the ground of marital status in
addition to curing the sex-based discrimination of this credit practice.
3. Devaluation of the female spouse's income
The elusiveness of the line between sex discrimination and marital
status discrimination is well demonstrated in examining the regulation
dealing with the credit practice of devaluing the income of the female
spouse. Investigations into the credit problems of women documented
that creditors either refused to count or discounted the wife's in-
come.66 This often meant that families with both spouses working were
unable to qualify for loans, particularly mortgage loans, based on the
actual disposable income available to the family. This difficulty was
compounded if the wife were the sole or principal wage earner, or if
her income were produced by part-time work. Frustrated by this de-
valuation, many couples resorted to signing the notorious "baby let-
ter" to satify creditors that the wife was "on the pill" or would have an
abortion if she became pregnant. 67
The only justification for this practice was the sex-based assump-
tion that women of child-bearing age would get pregnant and leave
the labor market, thus makirig the wife's income unreliable. This prac-
tice is primarily discrimination based on marital status, however, be-
cause married persons are most disadvantaged by it. Regardless of the
nature of the discrimination, the assumption itself is not highly reli-
able.68 In accordance with the policy of non-discrimination, the regu-
lations preclude the discounting of income because of sex or marital
status69 or because it is derived from part-time employment.70
66. See 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5, at 192-95.
One Veterans Administration official is reported as stating: "It is un-American to
count a woman's income ... the only way to count it would be if she were to have
a hysterectomy." Id. See also S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1973);
1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 211-75 (statistics supplied by
the United States Commission on Civil Rights). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, WOMEN AND HOUSING, A REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN FIVE AMERICAN CITIES (1975).
67. A couple normally assured the creditor in writing that the wife was "on the
pill," that she would have an abortion if she became pregnant, or that one of the
spouses was sterile. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORTGAGE MONEY: WHO GETS
IT? (1974), in 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2, at 213, 256.
68. See note 58 supra.
69. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-180 (1976).
70. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-180 (1976).
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B. Methods to Accommodate Conflicting Statutory Policies
Numerous regulations that control the kind of information that a
creditor can seek on an application form complement the provisions
governing the creditor's method of evaluating applicants. These regu-
lations further the policy of non-discrimination by limiting access to
information that might prompt a creditor to act on one of the prejudi-
cial group assumptions previously mentioned. At the same time the
policy of protecting the creditor from unwarranted risk is furthered by
forcing a creditor to obtain information that more accurately indicates
ability and willingness to pay then questionable assumptions about
persons of a particular sex or marital status.
The statutory policies are balanced via several different methods.
The creditor is precluded from acquiring information with high preju-
dicial potential and slight predictive value. Where the information fa-
cilitates an evaluation of creditworthiness, however, the creditor is
allowed to ask for such data, although the extent of the inquiry or the
way in which it must be made is regulated to minimize discrimination.
In Washington, a creditor cannot ask the applicant's sex directly 7'
or indirectly by requiring the applicant to select a sex-specific title in
prefix to his or her name,72 or using sex-specific terminology, such as
"wife's name," on the application form. 73 This represents a judgment
that the sex of the applicant is largely irrelevant in the creditwor-
thiness determination, 74 yet has a significant prejudicial impact be-
cause of assumptions that are often made about the sex group of the
applicant. Consequently, in order to direct its attention to more signif-
icant indicia of creditworthiness, the creditor is totally precluded from
acquiring information that might lead to an unreliable assumption.
The balance is struck in a slightly different way with information
that is prejudicial, yet still contains some factor that is genuinely re-
lated to ability or willingness to pay. Here the creditor is prevented
from directly acquiring the information that leads to a prejudicial as-
71. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-080 (1976). That section provides that a cred-
itor may not ask an applicant's sex, race, creed, color, or national origin unless so
required by an enforcement agency in order to monitor compliance. There is cur-
rently no similar provision in the federal regulations. But see proposed revision of
12 C.F.R. § 202.5 in 41 Fed. Reg. 49,123 (1976).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(c)(4) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-090(1)
(1976).
73. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(c)(4) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-090(2)
(1976).
74. See note 33 supra.
352
Vol. 52: 335, 1977
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
sumption, and is required instead to seek information directly about
the factor that is genuinely related to creditworthiness. For example,
the creditor may not directly inquire about birth control or family
plans75 because such inquiries are based on the two-part assumption
that women of childbearing age will have children and then leave the
labor force. The creditor may still evaluate creditworthiness, however,
in terms of continuity of income and continued ability to repay.76
A similar approach is employed in inquiries about marital status. In
general, the creditor is permitted to ascertain an applicant's marital
status because this information is necessary to determine what prop-
erty is available to repay any debt incurred by the applicant.77 The
way in which this inquiry may be made is restricted in order to mini-
mize prejudicial assumptions. Thus, the creditor may ascertain
whether an applicant is married, unmarried, or separated,78 because
the spouses of married or separated persons may have rights to the
assets of the applicant under the laws of a particular state. The cred-
itor may not ask if an applicant is divorced, however, because credi-
tors so often assume that all divorced -persons are "unstable.179 In
addition, once the creditor has learned that an applicant is married or
separated, direct inquiry about the spouse or former spouse is con-
75. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(h) (1976). The creditor is precluded both from inquiring
about birth control practices, childbearing intentions or capabilities, and from con-
sidering group statistics in connection therewith. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
162-40-210(2) to (3) (1976).
76. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a), (e) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-210
(1276). See also text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
77. The federal regulations provide that a creditor may not ask the applicant's
marital status "if the applicant applies for an unsecured separate account." 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.4(c)(1) (1976). Thus, by inference, the creditor may request information
about marital status when the application is for a secured loan because the spouse's
signature may be necessary on the security agreement under the relevant provisions
of state law.
The federal regulation contains specific exemptions for creditors in community prop-
erty states and for creditors operating under small loan laws. The latter exception is
based on a statutory provision that preempts state and federal small loan laws that
require certain creditors to aggregate loans to spouses for purposes of determining
permissible finance charges or loan ceilings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) (Supp. V 1975).
See also [ 1976] 1 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 540 (chart indicating that some form
of small loan law exists in nearly every state). This category of creditor may always
have to ask about marital status in a state which has a provision in its small loan law
concerning separate loans to spouses. In Washington, the creditor may always ascertain
the applicant's marital status. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-070 (1976).
78. The creditor may ask only whether the applicant is married, unmarried, or
separated. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(c)(2) (1976). In Washington, the status "unmarried"
may be followed by the parenthetical "includes single, divorced and widowed" in
order to assist the applicant in determining which status to designate on the applica-
tion form. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-070 (1976).
79. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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fined to specific situations in which the rights or assets of the spouse or
former spouse will have a significant impact on the creditworthiness of
the applicant. 80
The regulation of inquiries about alimony, child support, and main-
tenance payments utilizes all the methods mentioned previously and is
perhaps the best example of the way the two statutory policies may be
accommodated. 81 It has been consistently documented that creditors
refused to count alimony, child support, and maintenance payments
as income to the recipient, primarily because such payments were re-
garded as unreliable.82 Moreover, the fact that such payments were
being received often detracted from the recipient's other credit qualifi-
cations by confirming the applicant's "unstable" divorced status,
serving as an entry to a former spouse's poor credit rating, or creating
the potential for the recipient to "overextend" monetary resources by
foolishly relying on income that might disappear at any time. Ironi-
cally, although such payments were seldom counted as income to the
recipient-applicant, they were nearly always deducted from the in-
come of the spouse obligated to make them. 83
The regulations do acknowledge the propriety of inquiring to what
extent an applicant for credit may be obligated to make child support,
alimony, or maintenance payments because this obligation is like any
other debt that might be owed by an applicant.8 4 The creditor may
not ask whether income is derived from such sources, however,
without first disclosing that an applicant need not report this income if
he or she does not wish to rely on it to establish creditworthiness. 85
Finally, the creditor must treat alimony, child support, or mainte-
80. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40--150 (1976).
The creditor may acquire information about a spouse's assets indirectly, however, in
the process of evaluating ownership of jointly owned assets, [1976] 5 CoNs. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 42,037; or verifying the income of a self-employed person via in-
spection of his or her most recent income tax return. id. 42.046; or checking the
credit history of an account listed in the name of a spouse or former spouse if the
applicant relies on such an account to establish creditworthiness. Id. T 42.006.
Presumably such information could not be used in a detrimental manner by the
creditor without violating the general prohibition against discrimination in 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.2 (1976). See aIlso WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-030 (1976).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c). (d) (1976), WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-110 (1976).
82. See 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5. at 553-
54: 1974 Credit Discrimination Hearings, supra note 2. at 272. 312: S. REP. No.
93-278, 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. 17 (1973); UTAH STUDY. supra note 7. at 44.
83. UTAH STUDY. sutpra note 7, at 45.
84. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (1976).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1) (1976): WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-110(l)
(1976).
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nance payments as income to the extent that such payments are likely
to be consistently made.86 Thus, a balancing of all concerns pre-
viously outlined is reflected in a single regulation: information with
prejudicial potential cannot be obtained where it does not affect credit-
worthiness at all; the creditor is required to evaluate subfactors that
genuinely relate to creditworthiness and the creditor is permitted to
inquire directly about an outstanding obligation that would have an
impact on ability to pay.8 7
C. Integrating State Property Laws and Equal Credit Opportunity
The most complex problem presented by equal credit opportunity is
to overlay its requirements on existing state property systems that are
themselves varied and well established. This task will fall primarily to
the individual states because neither the federal statute nor the federal
regulations make any attempt to deal specifically with this problem.
Both purport to exempt a creditor who makes distinctions on the basis
of sex or marital status in consideration of "state property laws di-
rectly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness."88 The federal regula-
tions therefore deal with state laws indirectly, usually by exempting
acts required by state law from certain regulatory provisions.8 9
86. Suggested factors for evaluating the reliability of alimony, child support, or
maintenance payments include "whether the payments are received pursuant to a
written agreement or court decree; the length of time the payments have been re-
ceived; the regularity of receipt; the availability of procedures to compel payment;
and the creditworthiness of the payor." 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(2) (1976).
87. The Washington regulations go one step further than the federal regulations
and place an affirmative duty on the creditor to leave space on an application form
for an applicant to provide information that creditors have either treated as irrelevant
to creditworthiness or failed to evaluate simply because it was not requested. Space
must be provided for the spouse's first and last name, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40--
120 (1976), any other names in which credit references or credit history may be
obtained, id. § 162-40-130, and, under "other income," any income derived from
alimony, child support, or maintenance payments. Id. § 162-40-110(2).
The regulation allowing an applicant to indicate other names in which credit ref-
erences may be obtained exists because a credit history usually cannot be verified
without a name and an account number. Therefore, women who listed only the
account numbers of joint accounts in the husband's name frequently were treated as
lacking a credit history.
88. See U.S.C. § 1691(b) (Supp. V 1975); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(1) (1976).
89. For example, a creditor may require the signature of the spouse of a married
or separated applicant where necessary or where reasonably believed by the creditor
to be necessary to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights to property
or assign earnings. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(c) (1976). Similarly, a spouse's signature may
be required in a community property state where the applicant lacks the power to
manage or control community property unless the applicant has sufficient separate
property to qualify for the amount of credit requested. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b)
(1976).
355
Washington Law Review
One obvious difficulty is to decide what is or is not a "state prop-
erty law." The potential breadth of the term "property" creates the
possibility that a myriad of state statutes fall within the statutory ex-
ception. Moreover, this definitional problem is compounded by the
addition of the words "directly or indirectly affecting credit-
worthiness." First, this presents the possibility that whether a law is
indeed a property law will be decided simply by reference to whether
it has an effect on creditworthiness. Second, the term "creditwor-
thiness" is itself elusive, both because the statute and the regulations do
not define it, and because there is no agreement in the industry con-
cerning its meaning.9 0 Consequently, there is a very real likelihood
that the exception will swallow the rule of non-discrimination, at least
on the federal level.
The enforcement experience with equal credit opportunity in Wash-
ington prior to 1976 illustrates the dangers of such general exceptions
and underscores the need for a basic approach to equal credit oppor-
tunity problems. Although the statute in Washington is fairly specific
about forbidden credit practices, it, too, contains a general exception
permitting creditors to consider the application of the community
property law. 91 The state exception for "community property" laws is
clearly narrower than the exception in the federal statute for "prop-
erty laws." In practice, however, creditors have cited "community
property" law as the justification for ignoring the marital status provi-
sions of the discrimination law. 92
Thus, the effective implementation of equal credit opportunity re-
quires much more than the simple exemption of state property stat-
utes. Each law, whether community property or otherwise, must be
examined to determine its relationship to creditworthiness and the
extent to which it has an adverse impact because of sex or marital
status. Where a conflict is evident, a decision must be made whether
creditworthiness or other policies outweigh the adverse impact on a
protected group or whether a compromise can lessen that impact
while preserving creditors' rights.
Although the federal regulations do not provide general guidelines
for determining which state property laws may be considered or ap-
90. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
91. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.176(3) (1976).
92. Conversation with Karen Fox, Staff Representative, Washington State Human
Rights Commission. August 18, 1976.
356
Vol. 52: 335, 1977
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
plied without discriminating, they do preempt inconsistent state credit
discrimination laws to the extent of the inconsistency. 93 Therefore a
state that adopts regulations to implement its own equal credit oppor-
tunity statute must deal with problems exempted under the "state prop-
erty laws" provision of the federal statute while avoiding inconsistency
with the "practice by practice" regulations already adopted by the
Federal Reserve Board. The Washington regulations attempt, with
some success, to make adjustments between the Washington marital
property system and equal credit opportunity. In the process, how-
ever, the state regulations do not altogether avoid inconsistency with
federal standards.9 4 This inconsistency results in part from the fact
that the federal statute and regulations simply do not address that
element of the creditworthiness determination covered by state laws.
In addition, the state regulations, by relying heavily on the federal
"practice" model, simply fail to examine the Washington marital
property laws in terms of the competing statutory policies.
1. Compatibility of Washington's community property system with
equal credit opportunity standards
Consideration of Washington community property law in terms of
the equal credit opportunity model previously suggested provides
examples of the subtle analytical distinctions needed to distinguish dif-
ferential treatment that is primarily sex-based from that which can be
attributed to a particular marital status. By careful analysis, it is also
possible to separate instances where special treatment of the marital
unit can be justified by policies underlying the ommunity property
laws from instances where the community property laws are unjustifi-
ably used to burden the female spouse or the marital unit.
The philosophy of community property law has always been one of
spousal equality. "Each spouse is regarded as contributing equally to
and sharing equally in the economic well-being of the marital enter-
prise."'95 This recognition is the cornerstone of rules that vest rights in
93. 12 C.F.R. § 202.11(b) (1976). The 1976 amendments to the Act add a
similar provision to the statute itself. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of
1976 § 5, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691- 9 1e).
This new statutory provision makes it clear that state laws are not inconsistent' if
they are more protective. See also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-020 (1976).
94. See text accompanying notes 116-29 infra.
95. See Cross, Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729,
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marital property in both spouses regardless of the form of the eco-
nomic contribution made by the particular spouse. Thus, in a commu-
nity property state, the husband and wife may be regarded as an eco-
nomic unit.96
The philosophy of the community property system thus closely par-
allels a general theory of the equality of the female spouse. To the
extent that the acquisition of credit is an acquisition by the marital
unit, the principles of equal credit opportunity for the female spouse
and the community property system are compatible and mutually
supportive.
There is, however, a thin line between failing to treat the female
spouse equally in the extension of credit, and imposing special re-
quirements on a spouse of either sex because they are members of a
marital economic unit. Under the basic approach presented earlier,
the failure to treat the female spouse equally was analyzed as sex-
based discrimination, objectionable on equal credit opportunity
grounds. It is likewise incompatible with the spousal equality principle
of community property. Imposing special requirements on married
persons, however, indulges marital status distinctions which may or
may not be justified by the policies underlying the state law that re-
sults in the distinction. Therefore, exact identification of the group
affected is as important in evaluating a state law as it is in evaluating
other credit practices.
The Washington equal credit opportunity law recognizes the strong
presumption that acquisitions made during marriage are community
property, 97 and permits a creditor to assume that a married applicant
734 (1974). For a fascinating discussion of the historical origin and philosophy of the
community property system, see W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY §§ 1-53 (2d ed. 1971).
96. By contrast, the common law system submerges both the "wife's juridical
personality" and her economic existence into that of her husband at the time of mar-
riage. See Cross, supra note 95, at 733. For a discussion of the status at common law
of the married woman and the effect of Married Women's Property Acts, see L. KAN-
OWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 40-41 (1969).
Although certain selected disabilities have been removed from the wife in common
law states following the adoption of Married Women's Property Acts, the underlying
philosophy of the system remains the same. Thus, in a common law state, although
the wife may now control her own property, she is not affirmatively vested with rights
in acquisitions by the husband. This means that uncompensated contributions to the
marital enterprise such as childcare, housekeeping, etc., are not recognized as econom-
ically productive of the tangible marital assets. Thus, the husband and the wife in
common law states can be regarded as independent economic entities except where a
specific law attaches some special rights or responsibility to the marital unit. See gen-
erally 4A POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 623, 624, 624.1 (Supp. 1975).
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976).
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is incurring a community obligation and will be relying on community
property for repayment.98 Further, the creditor is permitted to ascer-
tain an applicant's marital status and to acquire information about the
applicant's spouse whenever community property is relied on as a
basis for repayment of the credit requested. 99
By placing burdens of additional disclosure on those who are mar-
ried the regulations make distinctions on the basis of marital status.
These burdens, however, are justified by the rights and responsibilities
placed on the marital unit by the community property law which pre-
cludes a married applicant from standing alone as an independent
economic unit. In order to evaluate the creditworthiness of an appli-
cant who is married, the creditor must have an understanding of the
economic picture of the marital unit, including an economic profile of
the applicant's spouse. In addition, such disclosure burdens are rela-
tively slight when compared to the protections provided by joint
spousal interest in assets acquired during marriage. Under the Wash-
ington regulations, a married applicant can avoid disclosure of finan-
cial information about his or her spouse by demonstrating that he or
she relies on separate property to repay the credit requested, e.g., by
producing a separate property agreement.' 00 In the case of a separate
property agreement, this difference in treatment is justified because
each spouse does operate as an independent economic unit.' 01
When the credit reporting system in Washington fails to recognize
the identity and economic contribution of the female spouse, however,
the resultant discrimination is based on sex rather than marital status.
Because the wife has a vested one-half interest in all community assets
and is equally responsible for all community debts, 102 the credit his-
tory of an account in the husband's name is truly the credit history of
the marital unit to which each spouse is fully entitled. A failure to
evaluate the creditworthiness of a female spouse by reference to such
histories is a burden placed on females, not on the marital unit. Simi-
larly, insisting that an account must be opened and maintained in the
98. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-140 (1976).
99. Id. § 162-40-150.
100. Id. § 162-40-140.
101. See, e.g., Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932); Union Sec. Co.
v. Smith, 93 Wash. 115, 160 P. 304 (1916); Gage v. Gage, 78 Wash. 262, 138 P. 886
(1914).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). See generally W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, supra note 95, at 114-16. See also Stockard v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24(1892); Aichlmayr v. Lynch, 6 Wn. App. 434,493 P.2d 1026 (1972).
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name of the husband places a burden on females alone. Consequently,
the position taken by both the federal regulations and the Washington
regulations regarding credit history and separate accounts 0 3 is fully
supported by the community property laws.
It is clear that where federal regulatory provisions are aimed pri-
marily at sex discrimination, the Washington marital property system
is fully supportive. In such instances, the adoption by the state of a
regulation similar to the federal regulation will not conflict with the
community property laws or the established federal standards. Placing
additional disclosure burdens on married credit applicants recognizes
the requirements of the Washington community property system
without conflicting with federal standards. The federal regulations
permit inquiries about a spouse if the applicant relies on community
property for repayment of the credit requested, and allows the cred-
itor to determine the applicant's marital status in a community prop-
erty state.'04
The potential for conflict with federal standards is greatest in regu-
latory provisions that contain elements of both sex discrimination and
marital status discrimination. Resolution of such a conflict should
initially involve separation of elements of sex discrimination from
elements of marital status discrimination. Because the community
property laws do not justify sex-based discrimination, such sex-based
elements could be readily eliminated. 10 5 On the other hand, if bur-
dens are based on marital status, the community property law must be
more closely examined to determine whether it actually requires such
burdens. Finally, the burden imposed by the community property
system must be compared with the burden imposed by other marital
property systems to see if it really differs. If not, there is no reason to
deviate from the federal standard, unless the federal regulation itself
has failed to take account of a "state property law."
In addition to providing a useful way to accommodate the Wash-
ington community property laws with equal credit opportunity, the
suggested basic approach gives insight into the way equal credit op-
103. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
104. See 12C.F.R. §§ 202.4(c)(1). 202.5(b)(l)(iii)(1976).
105. In addition, following passage of the Equal Rights Amendment and remedial
legislation occasioned thereby, there should be no Washington laws that require
creditors to make distinctions between men and women. See WASH. CoNsr. art. XXXI:
ch. 154, 1973 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. 1118.
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portunity, with its two statutory policies, actually functions in a par-
ticular state property system. The precise dimensions of a problem are
much clearer when examined in this context and the ability to recon-
cile properly the two statutory policies is greatly enhanced.
2. Methods of resolving credit discrimination problems in
Washington
As previously discussed, the federal regulation does not permit rou-
tine cancellation, reapplication, or alteration of the terms of an open-
end account when the creditor learns of a change in marital status.' 06
The regulation contains elements of both sex and marital status dis-
crimination. 107 The sex-based discrimination in the credit practice
governed by that regulation-that linked to change of name--can be
treated in Washington in the same manner as it is treated elsewhere.
With respect to the marital status aspects of the problem, however,
an examination of the impact of a change in marital status on the
creditor's rights in Washington illuminates some deficiencies in the
federal regulation due to improper evaluation of the creditor's needs.
The salary of an account-holder is the principal collateral on an open-
end account. 108 When a single person marries in Washington, his or
her salary becomes community property in the absence of a separate
property agreement. 09 Consequently, it is liable for community debts
and accessible to the new spouse's creditors as well as the account-
holder's creditors. Similarly, on separation or divorce, the salary be-
comes the separate property of the earning spouse and is not liable for
community debts." 0 Thus, it is clear that marriage, separation, and
divorce have a direct impact on the principal asset available for repay-
ment of any debts incurred on the account. For this reason a creditor
106. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
107. Id.
108. At least creditor representatives repeatedly so assert. Oral testimony of James
C. Middlebrooks on behalf of Allied Stores, at Washington hearings on proposed
regulations, meeting of Washington State Human Rights Commission, April 15, 1976.
109. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). Earnings are onerously acquired
assets. See Cross, supra note 95, at 746.
110. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1976). It should be noted, however, that
if a community debt'is incurred before separation or divorce, the creditor of the debt
may seek enforcement against the separate property of either former spouse which
had been community property during the marriage. See Dizard & Getty v. Damson,
63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964 (1964); McLean v. Buringer, 100 Wash. 570, 171 P. 518
(1918).
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arguably should be able to reassess its position when it learns of a
marital status change. 111
The community property law, however, does not call for any dif-
ferent treatment under the federal standards than that required by the
property laws of common law states. In a common law state with a
family expense statute, a single person who marries likewise becomes
liable for all family expense items incurred by the account-holder's
spouse.11 2 Upon separation or divorce, the creditor may still exert
control over the salary of the account-holding spouse; however, family
expense liability is lost when the marriage is ended.113 Thus, in both
the common law state and in the Washington community property
system, changes in marital status have an economic impact differing
only in degree. If the creditor should be able to reassess its position at
the time of a marital status change in Washington, it should be able to
reassess its position in any other state as well.
In another regulation which deals with the creditor practice of re-
quiring the signature of the non-applicant spouse on credit agree-
ments, the Washington regulation may conflict with the federal stan-
dard because the state regulation erroneously assumes that community
property laws require protective creditor action, in the form of the
signature of the non-applicant spouse, beyond that required in
common law states. Both the federal and state regulations provide
that creditors who impose signature requirements must do so without
regard to sex on all similarly qualified applicants.114 The provision is
designed to eliminate the credit practice of requiring wives to procure
the husband's signature on a credit agreement or loan in order to re-
ceive the credit requested. 115 Although the practice contained ele-
ments of both sex and marital status discrimination, it was primarily
sex-based because creditors did not impose similar signature require-
ments on the male spouse. Therefore, if the creditor now requires the
Ill. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
112. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68. § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1959). See generally
H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 186-87 (1968). For a compilation of the
support and family expense statutes, see Beckey. supra note 63.
113. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.070 (1975). See also note 112 supra.
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(a) (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-280 (1976).
115. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings on Economic Problems of Women, supra note 5. at
552 (statement of Frankie M. Freeman. Commissioner. United States Commission on
Civil Rights) (because of the myth that a woman needs male protection, creditors
often require a male co-signer, usually the husband or father). See also UTAH STUDY.
sutpra note 7, at 26. 40 (creditors require the husband to co-sign more often than the
wife).
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husband to sign when the wife applies for credit, then it must also
require the wife to sign when the husband applies. The federal regula-
tion provides that signature requirements must be imposed without
regard either to sex or to marital status." 6 In regard to the marital
status aspect of this regulation, a creditor cannot routinely require the
spouse of a married applicant to sign a debt instrument and thereby
become liable on the debt because this unfairly burdens persons who
are married." 7 In effect, this practice forces a spouse to be a guar-
antor of the debt although a similar requireiient is not imposed on
unmarried persons, particularly in unsecured or open-end transac-
tions." 8
The needs of the creditor due to the requirements of state property
laws are recognized in two exceptions to the signature regulation.
First, the .creditor may obtain the spouse's signature in a community
property state where the applicant for credit lacks the power to
manage community property and does not have sufficient separate
property to qualify for the credit requested." 9 Second, the creditor
may obtain the spouse's signature when it is necessary to "create a
valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights to property or assign
earnings.' 20 Under current Federal Reserve Board interpretations,
the spouse's signature may also be obtained when the spouse's assets
are relied on to obtain credit. 12 '
The Washington regulation takes the same general position as the
federal regulation on the marital status discrimination aspects of cred-
itor signature requirements. 22 In an exception-to the federal standard,
however, the Washington regulations permit the creditor routinely to
require a spouse's signature "where the applicant is relying on the
spouse's existing income to qualify for the amount of credit re-
quested."123
116. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1976); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-40-280 (1976).
117. See Federal Research Board letter of December 23, 1975, [1976] 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 42,021.
118. A creditor may require all borrowers to obtain a guarantor or co-signer but
it may not require that the co-signer or guarantor be the spouse of the applicant for
credit. See Federal Reserve Board letter of January 9, 1975, [1976] 5 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 42,03 1.
119. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(b) (1976).
120. See id. § 202.7(c).
121. Federal Reserve Board letter of November 26, 1975, [1976] 5 CoNs. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) 42,007.
122. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE 88 162-40-280, -290, -300 (1976).
123. Id. § 162-40-290.
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If this exception is interpreted to mean that a creditor can require
the signature of a spouse when the applicant spouse's own income
or other assets are not sufficient by themselves to qualify for the
amount and kind of credit requested, the Washington regulation is
consistent with the federal regulation. The creditor would be relying
on the joint assets and incomes of both spouses to establish creditwor-
thiness, and, as in other states, could obtain the signatures of both
spouses. 12 4
But if this exception is construed to permit a creditor to require a
married applicant to obtain the spouse's signature whenever the
spouse's income is reported and may be "relied on" by the creditor, it
is inconsistent with the federal standard. The inconsistency results
from the fact that the only thing the creditor gains by requiring the
additional signature is the separate liability of the non-applicant
spouse. 125 This in effect forces the non-applicant spouse to guarantee
with his or her separate property, debts incurred on the account and is
the very disadvantage to married persons that the federal regulation
prohibits.
Creditors readily acknowledge that in Washington the signature of
either spouse is sufficient to commit all of the community property for
ordinary community debts.' 2 6 This includes the ability to commit the
earnings of the non-applicant spouse if such earnings are community
property. Creditors also acknowledge that if the debt is for a family
expense, the non-signing spouse is separately liable for the debt.127
Creditors assert a need for the signature not to gain three-way liability
in an ongoing marriage, but to assure that debts can be collected from
either spouse in the event a separation or divorce converts community
property salary into the separate property of the earning spouse. t28
This feature of the Washington community property system, it is
claimed, creates the need for the Washington creditor to obtain both
signatures.
124. Unless, of course, one takes the position that spouses relying on community
property simply cannot be evaluated independently.
125. See Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves. 79 Wash. 411, 140 P. 328 (1914).
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). A spouse may not purchase or con-
tract to purchase community real property without the other spouse's joining in the
transaction. Therefore the signature of one spouse is insufficient to commit community
property for the purchase of real estate.
127. Id.§26.16.205.
128. The earnings of a husband and wife while living separate and apart are the
separate property of each. Id. § 26.16.140.
364
Vol. 52: 335, 1977
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
What this argument misses is the creditor's ability to make an eval-
uation of the married applicant for a separate credit account in Wash-
ington apart from his or her spouse. If the applicant's own salary,
which creditors assert is the principal asset relied on for repayment of
the credit extended, is sufficient to qualify for the amount and kind of
credit requested, the creditor should extend the credit without im-
posing the burden of separate liability on the non-applicant spouse.
During the continuance of the marriage, the creditor has the account-
holder's salary as well as the spouse's community property salary
available for payment of the credit.
In the event of separation or divorce, the creditor still has the ac-
count-holder's salary available for repayment of debts although it is
now classified as separate rather than community property. Thus the
creditor actually obtains a guarantee beyond separation or divorce in
addition to the separate guarantee during marriage. 129 Under the
above analysis, the Washington creditor has no greater need to obtain
the non-applicant spouse's signature than a creditor in a common law
state. What it seeks, therefore, is the same guarantor protection that
has been disapproved in the federal regulations.
The foregoing examples illustrate the value of examining a credit
discrimination problem in the context of a particular state property
system. When the disadvantageous practice is viewed in light of the
actual operation of an individual state's legal requirements, it is easier
to separate sex discrimination from marital status discrimination, and
to examine the necessity for treating individuals in a different manner
because of marital status.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both Congress and the Washington Legislature responded to prob-
lems of equal availability of credit by producing statutes that are po-
tentially broad in scope and general in nature. Consequently, the task
129. It is arguable that the creditor has gained nothing by the additional signature
after a separation or divorce. If the account is separate, during marriage the debts
incurred would probably be community debts. By his or her signature on the credit
agreement, it is possible that the non-account-holding spouse is agreeing only to com-
mit his or her separate property for payment of community debts. After separation
or divorce, debts incurred on the account would be the separate debts of the account
holder and the spouse who had previously signed could argue that his or her agree-
ment did not extend to those debts.
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of implementing the statutes has fallen to the regulatory agencies ad-
ministering them. Underlying these statutes are two major policies
that are potentially in hopeless conflict-one to maximize the availa-
bility of credit to applicants without undue emphasis on their mem-
bership in protected groups, and the other to permit creditors to eval-
uate effectively the risk of extending credit to such group members.
The Federal Reserve Board and the Washington State Human
Rights Commission, relying on the federal model, have used a prac-
tice-by-practice or piecemeal approach to regulatory implementation
of these statutes. Such an approach does not furnish adequate guide-
lines for the future. Therefore, it is suggested that a more detailed
regulatory analysis be employed in order to give appropriate recogni-
tion to both statutory policies. This analysis would first identify with
some precision the group that is affected by a credit practice or a law
upon which a credit practice is based. The effectiveness of the credit
practice as a risk-measuring device, or the legal necessity for the prac-
tice should then be evaluated based on either the characteristics of the
group vis-A-vis the use of credit or the policies underlying the law
which occasions the credit practice. This analysis enables the regula-
tory agency to make meaningful judgments about the extent to which
credit practices measure risk and the extent to which group members
are affected by the practice or law. In instances where practices that
in fact measure risk are found to have a severe adverse impact on
group members, the regulatory agency would be put on notice to
search for compromise solutions.
The suggested approach is, of course, not without problems of its
own. The most critical need is for hard data concerning protected
groups, including how many group members are adversely affected by
credit practices as well as the credit behavior of group members. Ad-
ditionally, creditors themselves should generate more precise informa-
tion concerning the actual risk factors in consumer credit so that the
need to rely on the generalized personal characteristics of an applicant
can be minimized. Finally, sensible implementation of equal credit
opportunity requires individual attention to each of the fifty state law
systems governing creditors' rights and remedies. So far, the federal
statutory and regulatory mechanisms, by simply exempting state prop-
erty laws, have pretended that federal standards can be superimposed
without such analysis. These state laws, however, may be so intimately
connected with risk that analysis of the Washington state system sug-
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gests that further pursuit of the federal policy invites confusion and
conflict. Consequently, the federal system should either rely more
heavily on state implementation of equal credit opportunity, or at
least develop guidelines beyond simple exemption of state property
laws.
There is agreement between creditors and applicants that credit is
an important commodity in the modem United States. Thus, there
should likewise be mutual effort to see that credit is in fact available
on an equal basis for all who would use it wisely and responsibly.
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